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Now to discover the poet and father of this all is quite a task, and 
even if one discovered him, to speak of him to all men is impos-
sible. . . . But if we provide likelihoods [εικότας] inferior to none, 
one should be well pleased with them, remembering that I who 
speak as well as you my judges have a human nature, so that it 
is fitting for us to receive the likely story [εικότα μύθον] about 
these things and not to search further for anything beyond it.
Plato, Timaeus2
In the first of the Paradiso’s direct addresses to its readers,3 Dante offers a 
warning that seems to recall the one that Ulysses failed to acknowledge as he left 
behind the confines of the Mediterranean Ocean to set out on the final, “folle volo” 
[“mad flight”]4 that Dante invented for him in Inferno 26:
 O voi che siete in piccioletta barca, 
 desiderosi d’ascoltar, seguiti 
 dietro al mio legno che cantando varca, 
 tornate a riveder li vostri liti: 
 non vi mettete in pelago, ché forse, 
 perdendo me, rimarreste smarriti. 
 L’acqua ch’io prendo già mai non si corse; 
 Minerva spira, e conducemi Appollo, 
 e nove Muse mi dimostran l’Orse. (Paradiso 2.1-9)
[O you who in little barks, desirous of listening, have followed after my ship that 
sails onward singing: turn back to see your shores again, do not put out on the deep 
sea, for perhaps, losing me, you would be lost; the waters that I enter have never 
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before been crossed; Minerva inspires and Apollo leads me, and nine Muses point 
out to me the Bears.] 
But while Paradiso’s first direct address warns of the poem’s power to seduce and 
destroy, its second offers a hope of a safe wake for those who crave “the bread of 
angels:”5
 Voi altri pochi che drizzaste il collo
 per tempo al pan de li angeli, del quale
 vivesi qui ma non sen vien satollo,
 metter potete ben per l’alto sale
 vostro navigio, servando mio solco
 dinanzi a l’acqua che ritorna equale;
 que’ glorïosi che passaro al Colco
 non s’ammiraron come voi farete,
 quando Iasón vider fatto bifolco. (Paradsio 2.10-18)
[You other few, who stretched out your necks early on for the bread of angels, 
which one lives on here though never sated by it: you can well set your course over 
the salt deep, staying within my wake before the water returns level again; those 
glorious ones who sailed to Colchos did not so marvel as you will do, when they 
saw Jason become a plowman.]
As other commentators have noted, the allusion to the Argo in this second 
direct address is recalled in the culminating canto of the Commedia when Dante’s 
poetic persona is represented as reflecting on the Pilgrim’s prior vision of “la forma 
universal” (Paradiso 33.91) in which 
 Nel suo profondo vidi che s’interna,
 legato con amore in un volume,
 ciò che per l’universo si squaderna:
 sustanze e accidenti e lor costume
 quasi conflati insieme, per tal modo
 che ciò ch’ i’ dico è un semplice lume. (Paradiso 33.85-90)
[In its depths I saw internalized, bound with love in one volume, what through 
the universe becomes unsewn quires: substances and accidents and their modes 
as it were conflated together, in such a way that what I describe is a simple light.] 
In reflecting on this experience, the poetic persona recalls the allusion to the Argo, 
claiming:
 Un punto solo m’è maggior letargo
 che venticinque secoli a la ’mpresa
 che é Nettuno ammirar l’ombra d’Argo. (Paradiso 33.94-96)
[One point alone is greater forgetfulness to me than twenty-five centuries to the 
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enterprise that made Neptune marvel at the shadow of the Argo.]6
In a certain sense, then, both the warning to the many and the promise to the few 
in Paradiso 2’s direct addresses are fulfilled in Paradiso 33, for the poet here 
describes his un punto solo as a point of letargo—as Peter Dronke puts it, “the 
coma of oblivion” and “a divine ailment, a self-forgetfulness in ecstatic wonder, 
which is not an obstacle to the highest seeing but its very condition”7—a single 
point in time that, though forgotten, is nevertheless greater in being forgotten than 
even the voyage of the Argonauts that had already been marveled at by a god and 
remembered in human history for twenty-five centuries by the time Dante’s Pilgrim 
began his own poetic voyage. The interpretive aporia posed by this juxtaposition 
is not, however, simply that the letargo was forgotten while the voyage of the Ar-
gonauts was remembered. Instead, the interpretive aporia is a consequence of an 
irony that attempts to control the fundamental instability of the image. This irony, 
which compels some kind of response from the reader, is that the significance of 
the theophantic moment can only be measured by the Pilgrim’s letargo in the face 
of it; that is, the significance of the punto is measured only by the reader’s aware-
ness of the poet’s inability to capture the continually vanishing trace of its effect 
on the Pilgrim. As Teodolinda Barolini aptly put it,
The instability of the analogy is structural, since the “punto solo” 
is analogous both, as object of the vision, to the Argo and, as 
duration of the vision, to the twenty-five centuries; making the 
tercet even more impossible to hold onto is the fact that its main 
action is forgetting: active continual, endlessly accreted forget-
ting. Infinitely fascinating and suggestive, infinitely impenetrable 
and dense, conceptually and syntactically illogical, but somehow 
offering a glimpse into the dialectic between simultaneity and 
eternity, point and duration, conflation and extension, the Neptune 
analogy is a fitting emblem for the poetics of Paradiso 33, its 
ability to conflate all time into “un punto solo” unmatched even 
by the canto’s final verses.8 
Therefore, on the assumption that the Paradiso offers the representation of 
the attempt to recall and communicate something either about this punto or by use 
of this punto as a poetic device, I would like to turn to the perplexing conclusion 
offered by Dante in Paradiso 33. Specifically, I would like to discuss the last 22 
lines of the poem beginning with the poem’s final apostrophe to God.
 O luce etterna che solo in te sidi,
 sola t’intendi, e d ate intelleta,
 e intendente tea mi e arridi!
 Quella circulazion che sì concetta
 pareva in te come lume reflesso,
 da li occhi miei alquanto circunspetta,
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 dentro da sé, sal suo colore stesso
 mi parve pinta de la nostra effige:
 per che ’l mio viso in lei tutto era messo.
 Qual è ’l geomètra che tutto s’affige
 per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritrova,
 pensando, quel principio ond’ elli indige.
 Tal era ieo a quella vista nova;
 veder voleva come si convene
 l’imago al cerchio e come vi s’indova.
 Ma non eran da ciò le proprie penne,
 se non che la mia mente fu precossa
 da un fulgore in che sua voglia venne.
 A l’alta fantasia qui mancò possa,
 ma già volgeva il mio disio e ’l velle,
 sì come rota ch’ igualmente è mossa,
 l’Amor che move il sole e l’altre stelle. (Paradiso 33.124-45)
[O eternal Light, who throne only within yourself, solely know yourself, and known 
by yourself and knowing, love and smile: that circulation which seemed in you to 
be generated like reflected light, surveyed by my eyes somewhat, within itself in 
its very own color, seemed to me to be painted with our effigy, by which my sight 
was all absorbed. Like the geometer who is all intent to square the circle and cannot 
find, for all his thought the principle he needs: such was I at that miraculous sight; 
I wished to see how the image fitted the circle and how it enwheres itself there. 
But my own feathers were not sufficient for that, except that my mind was struck 
by a flash in which its desire came. Here my high imagining failed of power; but 
already my desire and the velle were turned, like a wheel being moved evenly, by 
the Love that moves the sun and the other stars.]
Although I am especially interested in the significance of the poetic persona’s 
failure to recall and represent the Pilgrim’s experience,9 I am obliged to begin by 
recapitulating the theology that appears to structure these experiences. That is, I 
will begin with a brief summary of the theology that would be confirmed by the 
experiences—both those of the Pilgrim and those of the poetic persona who later 
attempted to recall and represent the Pilgrim’s experience—described in the final 
canto of the poem.
As a consequence of its representational instability, the canto has generated 
a wealth of interpretations, including attempts to ascertain the specific theological 
doctrines that would be confirmed by the experience it describes. Many of these 
interpretations have offered plausible claims for the influence upon Dante of theo-
logians such as Augustine,10 Pseudo-Dionysus,11 Boethius,12 Bonaventure,13 Alan 
of Lille,14 Hugh of St. Cher,15 Thomas Aquinas,16 and, especially, Saint Bernard 
of Clairvaux.17 It is not my intention in this essay to adjudicate between these 
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interpretations. In any case, I believe that Dante is such a synthetic thinker that it 
is only reasonable to assume that the experiences—both those of the Pilgrim and 
those of the poetic persona who is reflecting on them—described in the canto draw 
upon various aspects of these theologies.18 However, because my ultimate aim is 
to discuss the philosophical significance of some of the poetic tactics employed in 
this canto, I will do no more than lay out a rough interpretation of the theological 
framework that lends a certain degree of stability to the otherwise unstable repre-
sentations in the lines quoted above. 
I believe that, at the most basic level of interpretation, these final 22 lines 
of the poem describe both an intellectual and affective state for the Pilgrim—a 
perfection of both intellect and will together. I am, moreover, convinced that the 
commentators are correct who have identified this experience as modeled on that of 
a Pauline visio —a raptus in which the Pilgrim saw God in the same way in which 
many of Dante’s theological predecessors argued that Moses and Paul did.19 To 
begin with, Dante has established as early as Inferno 2 the grounds on which this 
comparison to Paul can be made. There, of course, the Pilgrim was unworthy of the 
experience;20 now, however, through the course of his journey, his soul has been 
prepared to receive by divine grace the glory of the divine light. Moreover, when 
we recognize that the entire poem establishes many direct correspondences between 
Christ and the Pilgrim—e.g., that the Commedia is set “nel mezzo del cammin di 
nostra vita” [“in the middle of the journey of our life”] (Inferno 1.1), the same age 
as Christ when he was crucified; that the setting of the Commedia is around Easter; 
and so on—it seems likely that the poem is preparing the Pilgrim for the kind of 
epiphany that, in a general sense, would be involved in a Pauline visio. Finally, 
the idea that the Pilgrim experiences a full vision of the divine essence would also 
be confirmed by Kathleen Verduin’s contention that the theophantic experience of 
Paradiso 33 is patterned as the conceptual opposite of the Pilgrim’s experience 
of “the union and commingling with the Satanic essence”21 suggested by Inferno 
34.25 in a direct address to the reader—“Io non mori’ e non rimasi vivo” [“I did not 
die and I did not remain alive”]—in that, whereas the contra-visio of Satan would 
be an impossibly empty vision of impotence, chaos, division, emptiness, and fear, 
the visio of Paradiso 33 would be the impossibly full vision of power, harmony, 
unity, joy (fruitio), and love. As Verduin puts it: “these two culminating visions 
toward which the Pilgrim is led and by which he is momentarily absorbed, that of 
Satan the Destroyer and of God the Creator, loom before Pilgrim and reader as the 
ultimate polarities of the universe” (213-14).
What is also relatively clear in the canto is that part and parcel of the experi-
ence is its excessiveness. Indeed, in the passages quoted above, the descriptions of 
the impossibility of the representation of the experience receive greater emphasis 
than the attempted representations of the experience itself. For instance, in discuss-
ing the punto [di] maggior letargo above, I mentioned that there is an interpretive 
aporia in the irony that the very measure of the significance of the theophantic 
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moment is that it cannot be remembered. A parallel irony is also invoked in Dante’s 
simile comparing his experience to the geometer attempting to square the circle. 
As in the case of measuring the significance of an event by the fact that it is utterly 
obliterated from ordinary memory, so too does Dante’s simile of the inability to 
square the circle—literally to “measure” (misurar) the circle—offer itself osten-
sively as an approximation of the inability to recall and represent the theophantic 
moment. That is, just as the Paradiso’s author recognizes that he cannot measure 
the circle with the square, he recognizes that he cannot measure the effect of the 
vision of God.22 
But, again, the aporia constituted by the instability of the representation is 
deeper. By Dante’s estimation, the voyage of the Argonauts had been remembered 
for more than twenty-five centuries, and the memory of an event across twenty-five 
centuries, as a continuous magnitude of years in human history, surely indicates its 
importance. However, precisely because no single point can be measured by a con-
tinuous magnitude, the punto solo of his vision of the divine is of an incomparably 
different order of significance. As Dante maintains in Convivio 2.13.27,23 the point 
cannot be measured at all—let alone measured by something finite—and so the 
significance of the voyage of the Argonauts and the significance of the punto can 
indeed be said to be meaningless in relationship to each other. By the same token, 
the inability to find the principle that would allow a geometer to square the circle is 
used in a simile that is wholly inadequate to measuring the supposedly analogous 
impossibility of measuring the significance of the theophantic moment. That is, 
the difficulty of measuring the punto solo is not, in fact, well-approximated by the 
analogy to the difficulty of measuring the circle with the square since the inability 
of the geometer to construct a square measuring the area of a given circle is not 
incommensurate to the same degree or even in the same way in which the finite is 
to the non-finite. Turning, then, to the final lines of the poem, the Pilgrim’s disio 
(“desire”) and velle (“will,” in the verbal infinitive, a common but technical term 
in scholastic discourse), we are told, have entered into harmony with the divine. 
Or, as John Freccero famously argued:
The souls who have seen God enjoy a perfect equality of powers, 
for the twin powers of the soul reach their own specific perfec-
tion when the soul beholds la prima equalità in His essence. The 
intellect, which desires unceasingly to know, is at last satisfied, 
because in knowing God it knows all that it possibly can know. 
The will, the perception of which is to love, celebrates the Primal 
Love in an eternal fruition.24
This conversion would, therefore, necessarily have been preceded by an intellectual 
insight that allows the Pilgrim to see, without the aid of fantasia—which is to say 
without any images25—the cosmos as a fundamental, undifferentiated unity. But 
precisely because this vision of unity can admit no difference, it cannot be measured 
by anything other than itself.
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I would now, however, like to turn away from the theological underpinnings 
of the canto in order to offer a different perspective on how we might navigate in 
the wake of lo sacrato poema. In trying to explain the cause of the dissolution of 
the memory of the theophantic moment, the poet provides two significant similes:
 Così la neve al sol si disigilla;
 Così al vento ne le foglie levi 
 si perdea la sentenza di Sibilla. (Paradiso 33.64-66)
[Thus the snow comes unsealed in the sun, thus in the wind, on the fluttering leaves, 
the Sibyl’s meaning was lost.]
The first of these similes relies on the metaphorical association between God and the 
sun. Accordingly, the process of forgetting described by the melting of snow in the 
rays of the sun functions metonymically to stand for the effects of the theophantic 
moment on the poetic persona’s memory of that moment. Thus, the paradoxical 
experience of the theophany as un punto solo [di] maggior letargo seems to suggest 
that the melting away of memory is like the melting away of tracks in the snow.
The second simile is more complicated. Here Dante is invoking Virgil’s de-
scription in Aeneid 3 of how the Sibyl allowed the leaves on which her prophesies 
were written to be scattered by the wind. Piero Boitani assesses this allusion as 
follows:
 Dante, then, recreates an image which another poet had labored 
on, and presents this image as an event he himself has witnessed. 
The poet being Virgil, and the relation of Dante to Virgil being 
what it is, this is hardly surprising. But the power of evocation 
that it makes us feel in Dante’s poetry is enormous: when poetry 
is about to fail together with language and thought, Dante sails 
through thirteen centuries of written word, of Western tradition, 
and rewrites—in the final revolution of intertextuality—an an-
cient poem to signify the end of poetry.26
John Ahern has suggested that this second simile for forgetting is countered in a 
certain sense by the very act of binding the Commedia as a book—a process that 
is aided by the various symmetries within and between the cantiche.27 With respect 
to the simile established in Paradiso 33.65-66, Ahern suggests that the allusion to 
the Sibyl’s leaves “plays on the reader’s fear of losing and scattering the patiently 
acquired text,” which fear is then relieved by the introduction of a metaphor for book 
binding in Paradiso 33.85-90.28 This metaphor, along with Dante’s employment of 
stelle as the final word of each of the three cantiche of the Commedia, functions to 
render the “poem in its material format a unity, a totum simul, rather than a tenta-
tive and easily disordered sequence”—i.e., these stratagems “safeguard the poem’s 
textual integrity.”29 In my own view, reading Paradiso 33 as the act of binding the 
Commedia may also, perhaps, offer instruction in how to read the Commedia in the 
68 Jason Aleksander
sense that, just as the binding of the book provides a preliminary (though not fully 
determined) order to the possible senses of the book, so, too, might Paradiso 33 
provide an ordering principle for reading the Commedia. If so, then beyond limiting 
ourselves to a discussion of the theological framework that has been the vehicle for 
the voyage, Paradiso 33 ought also to be noted for its value for a consideration of 
what the poem tells us about how to distinguish the vehicle from the voyage itself. 
Or to make my own mixed metaphors a little more clear, what I am suggesting is 
that not only does the final canto reveal Dante’s attempt to stabilize the narrative 
unity of the Commedia in a distinct theology, but it also offers instructions in how 
to read that narrative, instructions that expose important considerations regarding 
the relationship between poetic expression and human praxis. 
In order to discuss this aspect of the canto’s significance, I will begin simply 
by noting that no other canto in the Commedia offers so many repeated warnings 
concerning the limitations of poetic representation. There are other concentrated 
discussions of the poetic and fictive nature of the poem, to be sure. But I can 
think of no other canto in which Dante is so relentless in calling our attention to 
the limits of his poetic persona’s capacity to recall, represent, or understand the 
Pilgrim’s experience. These poetic tactics do not, however, indicate that Dante has 
abandoned the careful symmetry of his book in order personally to experience the 
ecstasis of his protagonist. As I have already suggested, the poetic constructions 
of Paradiso 33’s obstacles to recollection, representation, and understanding may 
simply be read as confirming the theological conception of Pauline vision I have 
summarized above. But these poetic constructions should also be read as indica-
tions of Dante’s carefully deployed strategy to establish his own poetic auctoritas 
by tapping into this theology.30 This second way of reading the final canto does 
not so much contradict or undermine the theological interpretation summarized 
above as it does shift attention to the significance of this theology for the practical 
implications of the Commedia. This way of reading the canto would, I contend, 
compel us to understand that the instability of representation in the final canto 
indicates a reason to be wary of the intrinsic significance of the metaphysical and 
theological material that constitutes the narrative through which the poem com-
ments on the value and importance of its own poetic medium. My hypothesis, in 
short, is that although the final canto does, in fact, encourage the illusion that the 
Commedia illustrates a distinct metaphysics and theology, Dante’s poetic strategy 
in this canto also compels us to read the poem against the grain of the theological 
framework that it otherwise seems to defend. If this hypothesis is tenable, then 
what we should find is that Paradiso 33’s supposed representation of a rapture in 
which the Pilgrim experiences a vision of God might be read less as the defense 
and espousal of that theology than as poetry’s conversion of the impossibility of 
grounding the requisite metaphysical or theological doctrines or insights into the 
sustanza e argomento—the substance and evidence—of practical reasoning.31
To understand why this hypothesis might be tenable, we first need to re-
member that the form of the Commedia is neither philosophical nor theological 
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in the narrow sense; rather, the poem, as the author of the epistle to Can Grande 
della Scala insists, is quite literally fictive in form.32 It does, of course, demand 
that we read it as something more than a fable, and it includes frequent and overt 
discussions of metaphysics and theology. But our recognition that its literal form 
is a fiction must necessarily make us wary of how literally we want to read these 
metaphysical and theological discussions. Consider, for instance, Dante’s fre-
quent depictions of his Pilgrim in a mode of incredulity or confusion at what he 
is witnessing (e.g., Inferno 3.10-12,33 13.22-51,34 Purgatorio 33.82-84,35 Paradiso 
4.7-9,36 and Paradiso 20.79-8437). As Teodolinda Barolini has argued, this tactic 
helps guarantee its readers’ suspension of disbelief by compelling them to identify 
with the Pilgrim in their own conversion from incredulity to belief in the process 
of generating meaning from the poem. The abstractness of Dante’s representations 
throughout Paradiso function similarly. That is to say, the credibility of Paradiso 
on theological and metaphysical matters is less a function of its dialectical or 
analytic probity so much as it is of its poetic tactics. The theological reading, for 
instance, is convincing not because Dante has offered irrefutable demonstrations or 
a dialectically persuasive case for his premises. Rather, the theological reading is 
convincing because readers are compelled by poetic stratagems to put themselves 
in the fictional space inhabited by the Pilgrim—and this strategy begins, after all, 
in the very first line of the Commedia by representing the journey as taking place 
nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita. 
Turning, then, from the general deployment of tactics such as these throughout 
the Commedia to the specific tactics of Paradiso 33, it is clear that the chief tactic in 
the final canto involves Dante’s sustained focus on the failure of his poetic persona’s 
memory and fantasia. To secure our belief that the Pilgrim saw what he saw, and 
therefore as if to convince us of the underlying theology, the poetic persona simply 
insists that the moment was beyond memory. Thus, the difficulty of comprehending 
and interpreting the underlying theological framework—a process that occurs for 
the reader not poetically but through analysis of poetic discourse—maintains the 
illusion that Dante is indeed offering the bread of angels promised or hoped for in 
the direct address to the reader in Paradiso 2. After all, just as the poem represents 
itself as having been written by a divine author (see especially Purgatorio 24.52-5438 
and Paradiso 1.13-1539), so too does it maintain the illusion that it can only be read 
and interpreted fruitfully—safely even, if the first direct address of Paradiso 2 is 
to be believed—by one fully prepared by the infusion of grace in the perfection of 
both will and intellect for the theophany Dante invents for his Pilgrim. One might 
even go so far as to say that the success of the Commedia’s illusion resides in part 
in its ability to give rise to a narcissistic satisfaction in reflecting oneself into the 
narrative Dante supplies.40 
In any case, although the poem often all too easily compels assent to what 
seems to be its underlying conceptual framework, when one attempts to derive and 
articulate coherent theological or metaphysical doctrines from the poem, one is 
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continually frustrated by glaring paradoxes and self-contradictions. For instance, 
leaving aside the difficulties of Paradiso 33 for the moment and returning to the 
terra firma of Purgatorio, we may recall that almost immediately after the Pilgrim 
and Virgil have safely traversed Hell, they are confronted by Cato, who demands 
to know whether the laws that govern the afterlife have been violated by Virgil’s 
presence. Virgil reassures Cato that, because he has been appointed the Pilgrim’s 
guide by a heavenly emissary, no such laws have been violated (see Inferno 2.52-
120 and Purgatorio 1.40-99). But this hardly satisfies. In particular, it raises the 
question of how it is that Cato himself may be the guardian of Purgatory since he 
is no more Christian than Virgil!41
Of course, these inscrutable theological ironies are not the result of sloppi-
ness on Dante’s part. Although theological paradoxes abound in the Commedia, 
Dante’s construction of them follows a consistent narrative logic that compels the 
reader to seek for the significance of the doctrines on which the poem implies or 
pretends42 it has been founded. Consequently, if we are willing to say that Dante 
is engaged in theology at all, we must recognize that the kind of knowledge his 
theology is intended to provide cannot resemble the kind of scientia that Albertus 
and Thomas, for instance, offer in their Summae. Indeed, Rachel Jacoff was un-
doubtedly right to note that “paradox, in fact, is constitutive of the Paradiso both 
theologically and poetically.”43 Accordingly, I acknowledge that it is possible to 
argue that the poem celebrates and gives meaning to a theological unity precisely 
through irony and paradox since, in its most explicit sense, Paradiso 33, as I have 
summarized above, offers what appears to be an attempt to represent the experi-
ence of a visio that could be neither corporeal nor even, fundamentally, imagistic. 
At this level, then, I recognize why many are inclined to interpret the final canto 
as, for instance, exposing “the limits of philosophy which must yield to poetry in 
evoking a wonder that surpasses the navigation of the Argo. Paradiso transgresses 
the limits of scientific discourse through the exhaustion of analytical methods in 
the volitional delight of the beatific vision.”44 
I do not here want to swim into the vast ocean of debate concerning whether 
or how the poem might constitute an imitation of Scripture or an allegory of theol-
ogy. Suffice it to say that I am partial to, for instance, Freccero’s assessment of the 
major difficulties involved in maintaining such interpretations.45 But I should say 
that I think recognizing the importance of Dante’s poetic tactics for convincing 
his readers allows us to see that, intrinsically—as if hidden behind a veil46—the 
Commedia subordinates the value of speculative (metaphysical and theological) 
inquiry and contemplative (mystical) experience to ethical deliberation—a proj-
ect which aims not at delivering to its readers a scientia, sapientia, or even visio 
concerning the objects of metaphysical or theological inquiry so much as it does a 
practical wisdom that aims at the regulation of human judgment in ethical praxis. 
Put differently, I think it is probably not quite as correct to say that the Commedia 
belongs to the tradition of vision literature so much as it is to say that the  Commedia 
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depends on the allegorical instability of its imitation of vision literature in order to 
open a space for ethical deliberation.47 
Thus, to bring my own voyage back to port, what I believe Paradiso 33 em-
phasizes in its culminating representations is that poetic expression is, for Dante, a 
species of ethical deliberation intended to help lift humans from a state of misery to 
a state of happiness. According to its theological underpinnings, the canto provides 
an attempt to capture what the ultimate fulfillment of human desire might be on the 
assumption that salvation is possible. And it may even be true that human beings 
are ontologically constituted in such a way that they must represent to themselves 
the possibility of a final happiness or blessedness (whether of a Christian type or 
not) as the ground for a coherent normative logic. If so, then perhaps, too, Dante 
is not far off the mark in the Convivio’s claim that our highest happiness would be 
the joy of visio and contemplation of the divine.
Veramente di questi usi l’uno è più pieno di beatitudine che 
l’altro; sì come è lo speculativo, lo quale sanza mistura alcuna è 
uso della nostra nobilissima parte, la quale, per lo radicale amore 
che detto è, massimamente è amabile, sì com’è lo ’ntelletto. E 
questa parte in questa vita perfettamente lo suo uso avere non 
puote—lo quale averà in Dio che è sommo intelligibile—se non 
in quanto considera lui e mira lui per li suoi effetti. . . . E così 
appare che nostra beatitudine, [cio]è questa felicitade di cui si 
parla, prima trovare potemo quasi imperfetta nella vita attiva, cioè 
nelle operazioni delle morali virtudi, e poi perfetta quasi nella 
[vita contemplativa, cioè] nelle operazioni delle virtudi intellet-
tuali. Le quali due operazioni sono vie espedite e dirittissime a 
menare alla somma beatitudine, la quale qui non si puote avere, 
come appare pur per quello che detto è. (4.22.13-18)48
[Furthermore, of the two activities [practical and contemplative] mentioned one 
brings happiness more fully than the other. I am, of course, speaking of contem-
plative activity. This is in pure form the activity of our most noble part, that is, the 
intellect, which the root love spoken of draws us to love as what is most lovable 
in us. This part cannot in this life attain the truly perfect exercise of its activity, 
which would be to see God, the highest object of the intellect, face to face; here 
the nearest one can come to this is to reflect on Him and perceive Him through 
His effects. . . . We may conclude, then, with respect to bliss in this life (which 
is the happiness with which I am at present concerned), that it can be attained in 
its imperfect form in the active life, that is, in the realization of the moral virtues, 
and then in its perfect form in a loose sense in the realization of the intellectual 
virtues. These two modes of activity are the quickest and most direct ways leading 
to supreme happiness, which we cannot attain here, as is by now apparent from 
the above discussion.]
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But the key thing to note here is that, even were we to accept the practical neces-
sity of positing the possibility of an ultimate human happiness, on Dante’s terms 
its fulfillment would place the one experiencing it beyond any temporal capacity 
to recollect, represent, understand, and therefore to communicate its fulfillment. 
In the poetic fiction of the Commedia, the poetic persona speaks of this rapture by 
speaking of his own failure to represent it. That is, what the problem of theophany 
in Paradiso 33 seems to reveal is that, regardless of whether or not such a blessed-
ness were possible for human beings, the Commedia nevertheless sacrifices its own 
ontologized notion of the good to the practical ethical significance of representing 
it. It is in this way that perhaps it is not a mistake to think that the Commedia of-
fers itself as a new kind of scripture—as a form of revelation that constructs its 
own authority rather than positing it outside of the temporal world. After all, just 
as Beatrice points out that scripture speaks in a human language accommodated to 
the practical needs of potential believers, so too does the Commedia accommodate 
itself to its readers’ practical needs by employing the poetic tactics I have discussed 
above. Thus, the Commedia itself works in the realm of ethical philosophy in a 
way analogous to the way in which the appearance of Piccarda and Costanza in the 
sphere of the Moon are said to be accommodated to the practical needs of a Pilgrim 
whose will and intellect are not yet capable of a Pauline visio (see Paradiso 4.37-48).
In short, the poetic strategy of Paradiso 33 (and by extension, that of the entire 
Commedia) necessitates a sacrifice of theological and metaphysical knowledge to 
the ethical project enabled by its poetic strategy for the deployment of theology and 
metaphysics. The canto therefore reveals that theology and metaphysics are less 
relevant to ethical improvement for the knowledge that they would offer about the 
ontological conditions of our happiness than they are as the sustanza e argomento 
of poetic representations of our practical needs with respect to any such conditions. 
Because the representations of Paradiso 33 maintain the illusion that the poet-
Pilgrim has indeed experienced a visio that would literally be beyond the limits of 
his fantasia, they ironically also emphasize the fictional nature of the theological 
and metaphysical framework in which such an experience is represented. In other 
words, although it may not be entirely accurate to say that the Commedia’s theol-
ogy and metaphysics are false, because the experience described in Canto 33 is 
represented only as if to allow its readers access to the poet’s attempt to remember 
and represent the Pilgrim’s rapture, the subtending theology and metaphysics never-
theless function as fictions—perhaps non falso errore (Purgatorio 15.117)—which 
only offer hope for a better life in temporal deployments of these representations 
in projects of ethical self-reflection. 
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